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Summary
A Lynx helicopter from the Royal Netherlands Navy lost a rotor blade during preparation for
take-off. The blade loss was due to failure of a rotor hub arm by fatigue. The arm was integral to
the titanium alloy rotor hub. An extensive material-based failure analysis covered the hub
manufacture, service damage and estimates of service stresses. There was no evidence for
failure owing to poor material properties. However, fractographic and fracture mechanics
analyses of the service failure, a full-scale test failure and specimen test failures indicated that
the service fatigue stress history could have been more severe than anticipated. This possibility
was subsequently supported by a separate investigation of the assumed and actual fatigue loads
and stresses.
Keywords: fatigue, helicopter, rotor hub, titanium alloy.
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1 Introduction
On 10 November, 1998, a Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) Lynx helicopter lost a rotor blade
during preparation for take-off. The blade loss was due to failure of a rotor hub arm. Figure 1
shows the failure schematically. It occurred in the "yellow" arm of the rotor hub, a monolithic
Ti-6Al-4V titanium alloy forging, across an elliptical plain section. Figure 2 is an overview of
the outboard fracture surface of the failure. Concentric semi-circular ring markings, so-called
"beach markings", on the fracture surface indicated fatigue failure beginning from the arrowed
location. This was on the upper surface of the rotor hub arm, towards the trailing edge.
The rotor hub had accumulated 3591.9 service hours until the failure, whereas the overall design
Safe-Life had been estimated as 5000 hours minimum, and the failure location Safe-Life was
estimated to be 8600 hours [1]. The failure was thus unexpected and apparently very premature.
In an initial response the helicopter manufacturer, GKN Westland (GKNW), suggested the most
likely cause of failure was poor fatigue properties of the hub material at the failure location.
This suggestion became the focus of an extensive material-based failure analysis [2].
This paper surveys the failure analysis procedure, the topics and techniques, and the results.
There follows a discussion of how fractographic data from the service failure and full-scale and
specimen fatigue test failures, combined with linear elastic fracture mechanics, led to estimates
of certain service fatigue stresses. These estimates indicated that the service stress history could
have been more severe than the fatigue stress history assumed for the design Safe-Life analysis.
This possibility was later supported by a separate investigation in which GKNW made a new
Safe-Life fatigue analysis that included a previously neglected service load condition called
"Minimum Pitch On Ground" (MPOG) [3].
2 Failure analysis topics and techniques
Table 1 shows the scope of the material-based failure analysis in terms of the main and
secondary topics and their relation to the potential problem areas (hub manufacture, service
usage) from which the failure might be explained. In more detail, table 2 lists the techniques
used to obtain information for the various topics. Two main points are to be noted here. First,
the failure analysis made extensive use of the rotor hub (M323) that failed in service and a rotor
hub (M6) that failed during a full-scale fatigue test. Second, both the fractography and
metallography relied mainly on Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM).
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3 Survey of the results
3.1 Thermomechanical processing and heat treatment
As stated earlier, the failed rotor hub (M323) was a monolithic Ti-6Al-4V titanium alloy
forging. The forging was produced from billet stock by conventional (α + β) phase field
working (extrusion + two die forging operations) to provide a uniformly worked α + β
microstructure. This processing was followed by annealing for 3 hours at 700 °C (973 K).
Precision sectioning of one of the fracture surfaces, at and near the fatigue origin, was done to
check the microstructural condition. This was normal, consisting of primary α and transformed
β, with some bands of elongated α grains. Figure 3 is an example metallograph showing part of
a band of elongated  α next to more equiaxed primary α. This example also shows where checks
were made for differences in primary α hardnesses and in-depth relative oxygen contents, using
Auger Electron Spectroscopy (AES). The elongated primary α tended to have higher hardness
than the equiaxed primary α, but the in-depth oxygen contents were the same [4]. Thus the
smaller effective grain size of the elongated primary α was most probably the reason for its
higher hardness.
The AES measurements also showed that nitrogen was not detectable within the equipment
limits [4]. In view of this and the above results, it was concluded that there was no evidence for
excessively hard and high-interstitial content α phase in the microstructure, and hence no
indication of a fatigue-initiating metallurgical defect (see Costa et al. [5]).
On the other hand, independent bulk chemical analyses, subcontracted by GKNW and the
RNLN, showed the oxygen content of the failed yellow arm to be 0.22-0.23 wt. %, which is
above the specification maximum of 0.2 wt. %. This discrepancy required closer scrutiny, since
oxygen is a strong α-stabilizer that increases the yield strength and hardness of primary α and
might – in excessive amounts – decrease the fatigue strength (in the first instance an increased
oxygen content appears to be generally beneficial to fatigue strength [6, 7]). However,
microstructural and microhardness checks, and fatigue, tensile and fracture toughness tests [2],
gave no indication that the above-maximum oxygen content could have been deleterious to the
engineering properties of the failed yellow arm.
3.2 Finishing
The secondary topics listed under "Finishing" in table 1 belong to two groups. Stress-relief
annealing, final machining and shot peening are the actual finishing stages, whereas the
remaining topics are checks, see table 2.
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The checks showed the dimensions and shot peening conformed to the specifications, and that
scratches on the failed yellow arm occurred during hub manufacture. Furthermore, the scratches
were not responsible for secondary cracks close to the fracture surfaces.
However, there was a finishing anomaly: a vacuum leak near the end of stress-relief annealing
at 625-630 °C (898-903K). The hub manufacturer checked for oxygen contamination owing to
vacuum loss. The contamination was no more than 30 µm deep and was removed during final
machining. To ensure uniform removal, the hub manufacturer drilled blind flat-bottomed
reference holes on all surfaces of the M323 rotor hub. These holes had to disappear during the
final machining.
The failure analysis included a check to see whether one of the blind reference holes could have
been at the same location as the fatigue origin in the failed yellow arm, see figure 2. It was
concluded that this was improbable [2].
3.3 Service damage
Scratches arising from service damage were not observed at the failure location of the M323
rotor hub yellow arm.
Service Stress Level Estimates
Service stress level estimates were obtained from fractographic analyses and fracture mechanics
concepts, as will be discussed in the next main section of this paper. The estimates were
consistent in suggesting that the maximum frequently occurring alternating stress, Sa,mfo, at the
failure location of the M323 yellow arm could have been well above 300 MPa, and even above
350 MPa. These are rather high values that suggest failure was due to frequently occurring
fatigue stresses higher than those used in the original Safe-Life design analysis.
4 Fractographic analysis and fracture mechanics and stress level estimates
4.1 Introduction
The starting point for this section of the paper is the fracture topography at the fatigue origin of
the M323 yellow arm service failure. Figure 4 gives a mesoscopic view of the fatigue origin on
the inboard fracture surface. This is optical fractography, which is often better at showing
mesoscopic features than SEM fractography. In the case of figure 4 there is a change in fracture
surface roughness, visible as a transition from dark to light grey.
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Similar changes in fracture topography were observed for the fatigue origins of the M6 full-
scale and M323 specimen test failures. These changes were mapped using combinations of
optical and SEM fractography over the magnification range 30× – 3000×. Stereo pair SEM
fractography was particularly useful in defining the boundaries between the changes in fracture
topography: figure 5 is an example, showing the same area as in figure 4.
These boundaries between changes in fracture topography were used with some concepts from
linear elastic fracture mechanics to obtain estimates of fatigue stress levels for the service
failure. Two essentially independent methods were used: (1) comparison between the M323
service failure and M6 full-scale test failure; and (2) comparison between the M323 service
failure and specimen failures.
4.2 Method (I): Comparison of Service and Full-Scale Test Failures
Figure 6 compares schematics of the fatigue origin areas of the service and full-scale test
failures. Fatigue nucleation was subsurface owing to surface shot peening (though titanium
alloys can show naturally-occurring subsurface fatigue origins at very long lives). Thus the
fatigue cracks grew initially in vacuo. When the cracks broke through to the outer surfaces there
was a subtle but definite change in fracture topography, namely that the fatigue facets produced
in air were more sharply defined than those produced in vacuo. Figure 7 gives an example of
this difference, whereby it should be noted that the SEM magnification for the facet produced in
air is twice that for the facet produced in vacuo.
Of more importance in the present context is the fracture roughness transition boundary, visible
in figures 4 and 5 for the service failure, and also found for the full-scale test failure [2]. Figure
6 shows that the crack sizes at each fracture topography change were smaller for the full-scale
test. This difference is consistent with the full-scale fatigue stress levels being generally higher
than those for the service failure. Table 3 shows the full-scale fatigue stress levels at the fatigue
origin in rotor hub arm 4C, which failed after approximately 7×105 cycles, representing 175
flying hours [8]: this was evidently an accelerated test.
There were two other differences between the service and full-scale test failures:
(1) The fatigue origins were respectively on the upper and lower surfaces of the rotor hub
arms. However, in both cases the fatigue origins corresponded to known positions of
fatigue stress maxima [2].
(2) The service failure location was about 8 mm outboard of the full-scale test failure location.
This difference is negligible with respect to the bending moments on the rotor hub arms
[8].
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In view of the above-appended comments on these two differences, it was concluded that the
service and full-scale test failures could be directly compared with respect to their fatigue stress
histories.
4.2.1 Method (I) Basic Estimate
Wanhill and Looije [9] showed experimentally that the fracture roughness transition boundary
most probably corresponds to the maximum plane-strain cycle plastic zone dimension becoming
equal to the primary α average grain size in (α+β) processed Ti-6Al-4V. The maximum plane-
strain cyclic plastic zone dimension is given by
( )2cyeffcy /K05.0r σ∆= (1)
where ∆Keff is the effective stress intensity factor range in fatigue, and cyσ  is the cyclic yield
stress of the material. Further,
)Y(aSK effeff π∆=∆ (2)
Where ∆ Seff is the effective fatigue stress range, a is the crack size, and Y is a geometric factor
dependent on crack shape and size and component shape and size. We now assume the
following equalities between the M323 and M6 failure locations:
(1) Same primary α average grain size. This is reasonable, since the primary α mean grain
sizes were similar for all investigated rotor hubs [2].
(2) Same cyclic yield stress. This is reasonable owing to the same thermomechanical
processing and heat treatment and the similar primary α grain sizes.
(3) Same value of Y. This is reasonable, firstly because the fatigue cracks were both
approximately semi-circular at the fracture roughness transition boundary, see figure 6, and
secondly because the crack sizes at this boundary are so small that the arm cross-sectional
geometry would have had no influence on Y.
(4) Same fatigue stress ratio, R = Smin/Smax. Since the failures did not initiate at the same
position, this assumption could well be incorrect. But, as will be argued later, any
discrepancy is likely to be of minor importance.
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With these assumptions we may write
( ) ( ) 6Meff323Meff aSaS ∆=∆ (3)
At the fracture roughness transition boundary the crack depths, a, were 1.02 mm for the M323
failure and 0.78 mm for the M6 failure, see figure 6. Substituting these values in equation (3)
gives
( ) ( ) 6Meff323Meff S87.0S ∆=∆ (4)
To proceed further we need to make the following additional assumption:
(5) For the M6 full-scale test the fracture roughness transition boundary was determined by the
level 3 fatigue stresses, see table 3. The choice of level 3 is based on Wanhill and Looije
[9], who showed experimentally that it is the maximum value of the frequently occurring
fatigue stresses that determines the fracture roughness transition boundary. Level 3
occurred as about 12 % of the total cycles, which is considered fairly frequent, while level
4 was most infrequent.
For the M6 fatigue origin it was therefore assumed that the maximum  frequently occurring
alternating stress, Sa,mfo, was 426 MPa. Then provided assumptions (1) – (5) are all valid, the
equivalence represented by equation (4) leads to the following basic estimate of Sa,mfo for the
M323 fatigue origin:
(Sa,mfo)M323 = 0.87 (426 MPa) = 371 MPa
4.2.2 Method (I) Modified Estimates
Additional estimates of Sa,mfo can be made whereby the assumptions (1) and (4) for the basic
estimate are considered invalid, either separately or together.
(1) Grain size. If we assume a 20 % smaller average grain size for the primary α in the M323
yellow arm (a conservative assumption [2]), then since cyr  at the fracture roughness
transition boundary will scale linearly with the grain size, we may write from equations
(1) – (4)
basic estimate
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( ) ( ) 6Meff323Meff aS8.0aS ∆=∆ (5)
and
( ) ( ) ( ) 6Meff323Meff S87.08.0S ∆=∆ (6)
Provided the remaining assumptions (2) – (5) for the basic estimate are valid, then the
equivalence represented by equation (6) leads to a second estimate of Sa,mfo for the M323
fatigue origin:
                                 (Sa,mfo)M323 = 332 MPa
(2) Stress ratio. The value of R for the M6 fatigue origin was –0.59 [2,8]. It is possible that the
M323 fatigue origin had a similar R value. However, we shall here assume the most
different R value that could be obtained for the M323 fatigue origin from the combinations
of mean and alternating stresses used in the full-scale test and thought to be  representative
of service [8]. This R value is –1.14 [2,8]. Using Newman's plane-strain crack closure
model [10], we may write the following expression for negative R values:
∆Seff = Smax (0.75 – 0.078 R) (7)
whence
(∆Seff)M323 = 0.84 (Smax)M323  ;  (∆Seff)M6 = 0.80 (Smax)M6
We now have to make an additional assumption that is not obvious, namely that the
equivalence represented by equation (3) is valid for differing R. As will be shown during
the Method (2) estimates, this assumption is reasonable for R values ranging from –0.59 to
–1.14. With this additional assumption, substitution of (Smax)M323 and (Smax)M6 into
equations (4) and (6) gives:
(Smax)M323 =  ¸
¹
·¨
©
§
84.0
80.0
 0.87 (Smax)M6 = 0.83 (Smax)M6 (8)
(Smax)M323 =  0.83 8.0 (Smax)M6 = 0.74 (Smax)M6 (9)
Provided the remaining assumptions not covered by equations (8) and (9) are valid, i.e. the
assumptions (2), (3) and (5) for the basic estimate, and recognising that for any Smax the Sa
second estimate
equal grain size
unequal grain size
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value is 0.5 Smax (1-R), then the equivalences represented by equations (8) and (9) lead to
third and fourth estimates of Sa,mfo for the M323 fatigue origin:
(Sa,mfo)M323 =   1.12 (426 MPa) = 477 MPa
(Sa,mfo)M323 =  1.00 (426 MPa) = 426 MPa
4.3 Method (II) Comparison of Service and Specimen Test Failures
GKNW supplied the NLR with fracture halves of three cylindrical fatigue specimens taken from
the M323 failed yellow arm. The specimens had been shot peened to the same specification as
the rotor hub arm. The fatigue test information is given in table 4. The cycle frequency was
152 Hz.
Figure 8 shows schematics of the fatigue origin areas of the specimens. The fracture roughness
transition boundaries were visible, but details within these boundaries were largely obscured by
fretting debris and hammering of the fracture surfaces as a consequence of fully reversed
stressing (R = -1). This behaviour was not observed for the M323 service failure and M6 full-
scale test failure. In turn, this indicates that in both cases the local R value was much less
negative than R = -1. Thus it is possible that the M323 fatigue origin R value was similar to that
for the M6 fatigue origin, as mentioned with respect to the Method (1) modified estimates.
Since the specimens were cylindrical, the fracture roughness transition boundaries approximated
to the configuration of semi-elliptical cracks in round bars. There is no straightforward stress
intensity factor solution for this configuration, but Murakami's Handbook [11] gives functional
relationships for certain values of a/c, a/r and c/r, where a, c and r are shown in figure 8. The
Handbook results closest to the configurations in figure 8 are summarised in figure 9, where we
assume a/c = 1. The actual a/c values were 1.15, 1.23 and 1.29, but there are no Handbook data
for a/c > 1. We assume further that the dimensionless stress intensity factors, F1, in figure 9
apply to the specimen crack sizes and shapes at the fracture roughness transition boundaries.
Interpolation of the functional relationship in figure 9 then gives the results in table 5. The
constancy of the Kmax,T values in table 5 is evidence for fracture mechanics control of the
roughness transition boundaries.
Further necessary information is obtainable by converting Kmax.T to ∆Keff,T. This may be done
using equation (7) and taking the specimens' R value of –1. The average result is ∆Keff,T = 15.3
MPa m . Figure 10 compares this result with ∆Keff,T values obtained for similarly processed
Ti-6Al-4V [9]. From what is generally known about stress ratio effects on fatigue crack growth
third estimate
fourth estimate
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rates (see e.g. Newman [10]), figure 10 shows a plausible functional dependence of ∆Keff,T on R.
The consequences of this plausibility are twofold:
(a) It supports the assumption that the fracture roughness transition boundaries for the M323
and M6 rotor hub arms and the M323 fatigue specimens are due to the same mechanism.
(b) At the fracture roughness transition boundary the equivalence represented by equation (3)
is strictly valid only for the same R.
Although point (b) might seen problematical, figure 10 shows there is little change in ∆Keff,T
over a wide range of negative R. Returning to the question of stress ratio differences discussed
for the Method (I) modified estimates, from figure 10 we obtain ∆Keff,T values of 15.3
MPa m and 15.0 MPa m for R = –1.14 and R = –0.59 respectively. This difference in ∆Keff,T
values van be neglected in the present context of service stress level estimates.
We are now in a position to estimate the service failure fatigue stresses using the specimen test
failures and making the following assumptions:
(1) The fracture roughness transition boundaries for the M323 service failure and fatigue
specimens are due to the same mechanism.
(2) The ∆Keff,T versus R relationship in figure 10 is valid for the M323 fatigue specimens and
service failure: in the latter case specifically with respect to (Sa,mfo)M323 for the fatigue
origin location.
(3) For the M323 service failure we may use the approximate stress intensity factor for a semi-
circular surface crack in a thick plate [12]:
KI = 2.24 S aπ / π (10)
where a is the crack depth at the fracture roughness transition boundary.
For the M323 service failure the fracture roughness transition boundary occurred at a = 1.02
mm, as mentioned earlier. We now substitute ∆Keff,T for KI, ∆Seff for S and a = 1.02 mm
(= 0.00102 m) in equation (10) to obtain a general expression independent of R:
ππ∆=∆ /)00102.0(S24.2K effT,eff (11)
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We use equation (11), the ∆Keff,T versus R relationship in figure 10, and equation (7) to derive
∆Keff,T, Smax, Smin, and (Smax – Smin) / 2 = (Sa,mfo)M323 for selected values of R, see table 6. As
discussed earlier, it is likely that the M323 fatigue origin R value was much less negative than R
= -1 and possibly the same as that for the M6 fatigue origin, i.e. R = -0.59. On this basis, table 6
indicates a reasonable estimate of (Sa,mfo)M323 = 372 MPa.
5 Discussion of the (Sa,mfo)M323   estimates
Two essentially independent methods of estimating fatigue stress levels for the M323 service
failure have been presented in the foregoing sub-sections of this paper. These methods share
only one assumption without question or discussion, namely that the cyclic yield stress, cyσ ,
was the same in all cases, which is reasonable.
Method I resulted in estimates of (Sa,mfo)M323 varying from 332 MPa to 477 MPa for the fatigue
origin location in the M323 failed rotor hub arm. Method II indicated firstly that the fatigue
stress ratio was much less negative than R = -1 for the fatigue origin location of the M323 failed
rotor hub arm. Secondly, a plausible value of R = -0.59 resulted in the estimate (Sa,mfo)M323 = 372
MPa.
The very close agreement between the basic estimate of (Sa,mfo)M323 from method I and the
intermediate estimate from method II is fortuitous. However, the general agreement between the
results of both methods, knowing that R = -0.59 is plausible, suggests that the maximum
frequently occurring alternating stress (Sa,mfo)M323 at the fatigue origin location of the M323
failed rotor hub arm was well above 300 MPa.
(Sa,mfo)M323 values above 300 MPa are high with respect to the rotor hub design Safe-Life
analysis. For example, the fatigue endurance limit estimates for the M323 service failure
location ranged from 299 MPa to 342 MPa [3]. The question now arises: how likely is it that
high values of Sa,mfo were indeed responsible for the M323 service failure?  This is discussed,
albeit summarily, in the next section.
6 Supplementary measurements of service loads and fatigue analysis
During and after the material-based failure analysis of the M323 rotor hub, GKNW investigated
all the service load conditions that could possibly be relevant to the accident. A particular
ground load condition, designated Minimum Pitch On Ground (MPOG), was found capable of
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including fatigue stresses above the rotor hub endurance limit. Furthermore, this load condition
had not been included in the rotor hub design Safe-Life analysis.
Accordingly, GKNW developed an MPOG load model to estimate the fatigue damage rate of
the rotor hub owing to this load condition [13]. Several assumptions were made about operation
of the RNLN Lynx helicopters. A notable assumption in the present context is the average time
of 7 minutes MPOG per flight hour. For a reasonably constant rotor speed this corresponds to
about 11 % of the total cycles, which is remarkably close to the level 3 occurrences in the M6
full-scale test, see table 3; and it will be recalled that the choice of level 3 to represent Sa,mfo is a
key assumption for the method I estimate of service stresses for the M323 service failure.
Using the well-known Palmgren-Miner cumulative damage hypothesis, also used in the original
Safe-Life analysis, GKNW found that the MPOG load condition for RNLN Lynx helicopters
could have contributed up to 70 % of the total fatigue damage to the rotor hub [3, 13]. Here,
then, is a strong indication that the MPOG load condition corresponds to high values of Sa,mfo,
and that these high values were primilarly responsible for the M323 service failure. One last
point is that it is irresistibly tempting to suggest that the MPOG load condition was also
responsible for final (overload) fracture of the yellow rotor hub arm while the helicopter was
preparing to take off.
7 Conclusions
Fatigue and fracture of a titanium alloy Ti-6Al-4V rotor hub arm from a Royal Netherlands
Navy Lynx helicopter resulted in an extensive material-based failure analysis. The failure
analysis covered manufacture of the hub, service damage and estimates of service stresses.
These estimates were obtained from fractographic analyses and elementary fracture mechanics
concepts.
The results of the failure analysis led to two main conclusions:
(1) There was no evidence for failure of the rotor hub arm owing to poor material properties.
(2) Failure was most probably due to frequently occurring service fatigue loads and stresses
higher than those used in the original design Safe-Life analysis.
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A supplemental investigation of service loads, followed by a new fatigue design analysis, gave
results supporting conclusion (2).
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Table 1  The failure analysis topics
Failure analysis topics and classification
• Thermomechanical processing and heat treatment
• metallurgical defects
• microstructural factors influencing fatigue
• chemical composition
H
u
b
 m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
• Finishing
• stress relief anneal
• final machining
• shot peening
• dimensions
• residual stress measurements
• scratches
• scratches and secondary cracks
S
er
v
ic
e
• Service damage
• scratches
• scratches and secondary cracks
• Service stress level estimates
• service failure versus full-scale fatigue test
• service failure versus specimen fatigue tests
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Table 2  Failure analysis techniques and purposes
• Documentation
• rotor hub production, microstructures, mechanical properties (including fatigue), chemical
composition
• hub finishing, especially stress relief annealing (in vacuo) and final machining procedure
• full-scale fatigue test data, M6 hub, simple spectrum loading
• ad hoc literature review of fatigue in α-β titanium alloys
• Testing
• high-cycle fatigue of unnotched shot peened specimens
• tensile and fracture toughness properties
• Fractography: service failure, full-scale and specimen fatigue test failures
• fatigue origins, fracture characteristics (micromechanisms), mesoscopic topography changes
• shot peening influence (compressive stresses in surface layers)
• EDX chemical analysis of service failure fatigue origin
• Metallography: service failure, full-scale fatigue test failure, other rotor hubs
• precision sectioning of service failure fatigue origin to look for metallurgical defects
- microstructures, microhardness, Auger Electron Spectroscopy for oxygen and nitrogen contents
• microstructures and microhardness checks on M323, M6 and other hub arms
- primary α grain size, percentages of α and β
• depth of shot peening on M323 rotor hub failed yellow arm (interference light microscopy)
• secondary cracks and fracture surface profiles for the service failure
• Other checks
• dimensions of M323 failed rotor hub and M317 rotor hub arms after final machining
• bulk chemical composition
• shot peening residual stresses
• scratches on the M323 and M317 rotor hub arms and their relation to
- standard finishing (machining, shot peening, etching, anodising)
- secondary cracks close to the M323 failure location (fracture surfaces)
M323 rotor hub failed yellow arm
 near outboard fracture surface of M323 rotor hub failed yellow arm
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Table 3  M6 full-scale test fatigue stresses at the fatigue origin in arm 4C
Level
Sa
(MPa)
Cycles per
"flight"hour
% total
cycles
1
2
3
4
287
360
426
512
2420
1090
483
6
60.5
27.3
12.1
0.15
Table 4  Specimen fatigue test information (R = -1)
Specimen Stress, S(MPa) Cycles to Failure
LT6MDF35
LT6MDF36
LT6MDF37
0±300
0±275
0±250
4.2x107
4.8x107
6.2x107
Table 5 Stress intensity factors at point A on the specimen fracture roughness
transition boundaries
Specimen Kmax,T = FISmax aπ ( )mMPa
LT6MDF35
LT6MDF36
LT6MDF37
18.6
18.4
18.4
Table 6  Dependence of (Sa,mfo)M323 on R
R
∆Keff,T( )mMPa ∆Seff(MPa)
Smax
(MPa)
Smin
(MPa)
(Sa,mfo)M323
(MPa)
-1.14
-0.59
0
15.3
15.0
13.3
379
372
330
452
467
440
-515
-276
0
484
372
220
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Fig. 1 Failure location in the monolithic rotor hub, a Ti-6Al-4V forging
Fig. 2  Macrophotograph of the yellow arm outboard fracture surface. The failure origin is
arrowed
Fig. 3 SEM micrograph near the M323 fatigue origin, showing the α + β microstructure,
microhardness (HV) measurements in primary α grains, and locations (a, b) analysed
for oxygen content using Auger Electron Spectroscopy (AES)
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Fig. 4 Mesofractograph of the fatigue origin on the inboard fracture surface of the M323
service failure, showing a change in roughness (dark to light grey)
Fig. 5 Stereo pair SEM mesofractographs of the fatigue origin on the inboard fracture of the M323
service failure: y-axis tilt ± 5 , some vertical foreshortening due to x-axis tilt for better visibility
of topography changes
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Fig. 6 Schematics of the fatigue origin areas of the M323 service and M6 full-scale test failures
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local crack growth direction local crack growth direction
Fig. 7 Microfractographic differences between fatigue facets produced in vacuo and in air
These details are SEM fractographs of the fatigue origin area of the M323 service failure
Fatigue in vacuo Fatigue in air
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Fig. 8 Schematics of the fatigue origin areas of the three failed specimens LT6MDF35-37.
Dimensions were obtained from SEM fractographs
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Fig. 9 Dimensionless stress intensity factors, Fl , at point A (see figure 8) for semi-elliptical
cracks in tension-loaded round bars. After Murakami [11]
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Fig. 10 Functional dependence of ∆Keff, T on R. The fatigue crack growth data are from Wanhill
and Looije [9]
